ABSTRACT: This paper experimentally explores how the enforcement of cooperative behavior in social dilemmas is facilitated through social as well as emotional mechanisms.
Introduction
Cooperation in social dilemmas is a phenomenon that is hard to explain but important to understand. Contrary to the predictions of theories that assume rational-payoffmaximizing individuals, people cooperate with each other in many situations (e.g. Ostrom, 1998) . The existence and enforcement of social norms that promote cooperation might be one reason for this. As was shown by Fehr and Gächter (2000) , cooperative behavior can persist when there is an opportunity to punish defectors.
However, although punishment can have desirable consequences, it can also have a negative effect on welfare (Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; Egas and Riedl, 2005; Gächter and Herrmann, 2005) . To correctly predict when punishment will have positive results, we must understand the behavior of individuals who punish as well as that of individuals who are punished. In order to do this, it is important to realize that emotions play an important role in decision-making (Damasio, 1994; Loewenstein, 1996; Elster, 1999; Thaler, 2000) .
The goal of this paper is to understand the motivations behind the behavior of both the punishers and the punished, and in particular, the type of motivations that must be present for punishment to promote cooperation. We concentrate on the role of social emotions, such as shame and guilt, as an essential component for the successful enforcement of cooperative norms.
Recent research has revealed that emotions motivate individuals to punish opportunistic behavior. Anger has been shown to be of influence when subjects have to decide whether to punish or not. Unkind behavior induces anger and the angrier the people are, the more likely they will incur costs in order to penalize such behavior (Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Quervain et al., 2004) . Thus, anger seems to be an important catalyst for punishment. But anger alone cannot fully explain why punishment is actually effective. This depends on the reaction of the individuals who are punished. For example, if individuals feel anger after being punished, they might be motivated to retaliate towards the punisher. Therefore, the existence of anger alone could lead to rounds of punishment and to a significant destruction of resources. What is missing to make punishment effective is a moral reaction of the punished. That is, 'rightful' punishment should lead to reactions in the punished that make them accept the punishment, adjust to more cooperative actions, and abstain from retaliation. We will show that the social emotions of shame and guilt motivate individuals to react in precisely this way.
Moral behavior has been shown to be critically linked to the ability for emotional reactions (Anderson et al., 1999; Moll et al., 2002) . While this is true for emotional reactivity in general, prosocial emotions are of particular importance.
Prosocial emotions (e.g. shame, guilt and empathy) are characteristic human emotions that facilitate prosocial behavior (Bowles and Gintis, 2001 ). They do so by inducing a feeling of discomfort when doing something that violates one's values or norms, or those of other agents whose opinion one cares about. Shame and guilt are both 'selfreproach' emotions elicited by the individuals' own blameworthy actions (Ortony, Clore, and Collins, 1988) . While they differ in multiple dimensions concerning elicitation and action tendency (Tangney and Dearing, 2002) , they are nevertheless two very similar concepts and are often elicited at the same time.
Their influence on behavior might be twofold. First, simply the anticipation of shame and guilt might induce behavior which is norm abiding. Second the experience of shame or guilt, after an action, might lead to behaviors to diminish the feeling. This might be through repayment, future cooperation or avoidance of contact with the interaction partner. If these emotions are elicited through punishment of selfish behavior, they might inhibit retaliation and encourage individuals to act more cooperatively in the future.
To test whether this true, we study, by means of an experiment, cooperation and punishment behavior in a social dilemma game, where we allow for retaliation by the punished. At the same time we control for the emotional experience of 'punishment-inducing' emotions such as anger and irritation and 'norm-enforcing' emotions like shame and guilt. We find that, individuals that act unkindly do nevertheless feel anger when punished. Consequently, punishment advances cooperation only when feelings of shame restrain the anger-induced desire to fight back. In addition, individuals who experience shame after being punished are more likely to act kindly in future interactions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the design of the experiment. Section 3 describes the subjects' behavior. In Sections 4 and 5 we analyze respectively the relationship between the emotions and the behavior of the punishers and the punished. Section 6 discusses the results and concludes.
The Experiment
Lately, punishment mechanisms have been analyzed in the context of public good games (using the framework of Fehr and Gächter, 2000) . However, in this paper we require a simpler setting where the causes and effects of emotions can be easily observed and analyzed. Hence, to study the impact of social emotions, we used a two person social dilemma game with and without punishment opportunities. 
The game
We will begin by describing the game without punishment opportunities and then we will describe how punishment is introduced. The game consists of two players which we will refer to as the 'first mover' and the 'second mover'. At the start of the game, the first mover receives 150 points whereas the second mover receives 100 points (see Figure 1 for the game tree). In the first stage, the first mover decides whether he cooperates or defects. If the first mover defects, he keeps his 150 points, the second mover keeps her 100 points, and the game ends. If the first mover cooperates, 50 of his 150 points are multiplied by six and transferred to the second mover. Thus the second mover receives 300 points while the first mover loses 50 points. In the second stage, the second mover returns an amount of points (r) back to the first mover.
Specifically, she could return 150 points (an equal split of the gains), 50 points (returning exactly the points lost by the first mover) or returning 0 points. After the decision of the second mover the game ends. Hence, if the first mover cooperates his payoff is π 1 = 100 + r and the payoff of the second mover is π 2 = 100 + 6 × 50 -r.
This describes the game without punishment. Punishment is introduced in the following way: after the decision of the second mover, the first mover gets his first opportunity to assign a nonnegative amount of punishment points to the second mover (p 11 ). Punishment points are costly for both players. The first mover looses p 11 points and the second mover looses 4 × p 11 points. In order to avoid large losses during the experiment, the first mover could assign punishment points only as long as the second mover had a positive number of points (i.e. ¼(100 + 6 × 50 -r) ≥ p 11 ≥ 0). If the first mover chooses p 11 = 0 the game ends. However, if the first mover chooses p 11 > 0 the second mover gets the opportunity to assign punishment points to the first mover (p 21 ). In order to avoid confusion, we will refer to punishment by the second mover as 1 Our game is similar to many of the social dilemma games in the literature, such as, the sequential prisoners' dilemma, the investment game, the trust game, etc. retaliation. Punishment by first movers and retaliation by second movers had the same cost and did the same amount of harm. Thus for each retaliation point assigned, the first mover looses four points. Like the first mover, the second mover could assign retaliation points only as long the first mover had a positive number of points (i.e. ¼(100 + r -p 11 ) ≥ p 21 ≥ 0). Again, if p 21 = 0 the game ends but if p 21 > 0, the first mover gets the opportunity to assign additional punishment points to the second mover (p 12 ), and so on. The process repeats itself until either one of the players has zero points and therefore can not be punished further, or one of the players decides to assign zero punishment points and hence stops the punishment phase. Thus, if the first mover cooperates her payoff is π 1 = 100 + r -Σ t p 1t -4 × Σ t p 2t and the payoff of the second mover is π 2 = 100 + 6 × 50 -r -Σ t p 2t -4 × Σ t p 1t . 
FIGURE 1 GAME TREE IN THE CASE OF NO PUNISHMENT OPPORTUNITIES
If we use the standard assumption of payoff-maximizing individuals, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game with and without punishment, is for second movers to return zero points and thus for first movers not to cooperate. However, if individuals do not only care about their own payoff, punishment might be used. If this leads to higher returns from the second movers, then first movers have an incentive to cooperate more.
3 Certainly, the use of punishment by first movers depends on the willingness of second movers to retaliate, which in turn depends on 2 Note that since punishment is always costly, it is never credible at any stage.
3 For example, using the same assumptions they use about the distribution of types, the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) predicts that in the case of no punishment 40% of second movers would return 150 points but this is not enough to make first movers cooperate. Hence cooperation is nonexistent. In the case of punishment, there are enough first movers that would punish so that all second movers return 150 points and hence all first movers cooperate.
the willingness of first movers to punish once again, and so on. This, in our opinion is a more realistic way of modeling social punishment. After all, if there is access to a punishment technology, it is likely that both the punisher and the punished have access to it. This would give the punished the opportunity to retaliate. Moreover, we believe that in general it is possible to avoid further interaction if instead of punishing one simply walks away. To our knowledge there is no other paper which examines the punishment behavior of individuals in such a setting. 
Experimental design and procedures
The computerized experiment was conducted in March 2005 in the CREED laboratory at the University of Amsterdam. In total 162 students from the University of Amsterdam participated in the experiment. Approximately 54% were students of economics and the rest came from a variety of fields such as biology, political science, law, and psychology. The average age was 22 years and 58% of the participants were male.
Each subject played twice the social dilemma game described in the previous section. We used a perfect strangers matching procedure to avoid any reputation effects. In total, 26 subjects participated in the baseline treatment, that is, they played the game without punishment opportunities. The remaining 136 subjects participated in the punishment treatment. Earnings were calculated in points and points were exchanged for money at the rate of 40 points for 1 euro. The average earnings were 10.55 euros (this includes a show-up fee of 1 euro). The whole experiment lasted about one hour. Subjects were recruited through the Internet and the CREED recruitment website.
After arrival in the reception room, subjects were randomly assigned to a table in the lab. Once everyone was seated, subjects were given the instructions for the experiment (see Appendix A). Subjects were told that the experiment consisted of two independent parts. We emphasized the fact that they will interact with different individuals in each part, and hence, their choices in the first part would not affect their earnings in the second part. After this, the one-shot social dilemma game was described as the first part of the experiment. When everybody had finished reading the instructions, subjects had to answer a few questions to ensure their understanding of the experiment. Subsequently, the subjects played the social dilemma game via the computer (Part 1). 5 At the end of the first part, instructions were distributed concerning the second part of the experiment. The instructions informed subjects that they were about to play the same game once again. Furthermore, they would be in the same position as in the first part (i.e. first or second mover), and with certainty, their partner would not be the same partner they had played with in the first part. After they played the second part of the experiment (Part 2), subjects filled in a debriefing questionnaire and thereafter they were paid out their earnings in private and dismissed.
To observe if emotional reactions of shame and guilt influence the efficiency of the punishment mechanism, we used self reports to measure these and other emotions during the game. Furthermore, we measured expectations concerning the behavior of the other player and fairness perceptions. Emotions were always measured after subjects observed the choice of the other player but before they made their own choice. Expectations about the behavior of the other player were asked after the subjects made their choice and before they observed the actual choice of the other.
Finally, fairness perceptions were measured at the end of the experiment in the debriefing questionnaire.
We measured emotions, expectations and fairness perceptions through selfreports, which are a reliable and often used technique in social psychology (e.g. Robinson and Clore, 2002) . Emotions and fairness perceptions were measured using seven-point scales, and expectations were measured by asking for a point estimate of the most likely action. 6 The measured emotions were: anger, surprise, shame, happiness, guilt, irritation and gratitude.
Observed Behavior
In this section, we give an overview and briefly discuss the behavior of first and second movers. A detailed summary of the behavioral data can be found in Appendix 5 The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999) . 6 Emotional intensity was measured from: 1 = 'not at all' to 7 = 'very intensely'. The fairness of an action was measured from: 1 = 'very unfair' to 7 = 'very fair'. The wording of the questions is available in Appendix A.
B. We start by investigating how often first movers cooperate and, when given the opportunity, how much second movers return. Comparing the baseline and the punishment treatments allows us to observe the effect of the punishment institution on the subjects' behavior. Then, in order to explain any differences induced by punishment, we analyze the punishment behavior of first movers as well as the retaliatory behavior of second movers. Finally, we examine whether the opportunity to punish has an effect on how subjects adjust their behavior from part 1 to part 2. 
Cooperation and Returns

A: B: FIGURE 2 -MEAN AMOUNT OF POINTS SENT BY COOPERATING FIRST MOVERS AND RETURNED BY SECOND MOVERS IN EACH PART AND TREATMENT
As can be seen in Figure 2A , in both treatments, almost all first movers cooperate in the first part (more than 84.6%). However, in the absence of punishment, cooperation decreases substantially in the second part. If there are punishment opportunities, first movers cooperate equally often in both parts. Testing for differences between treatments confirms this observation. There is no significant difference in cooperation in the first part (p = 0.837) but a highly significant difference in the second (p < 0.001). 7 There is an even starker difference between treatments when we consider the behavior of second movers. That is, in each part, second movers return noticeably less in the absence of punishment (p < 0.044). Given this behavior of second movers, it is easy to understand the decrease in cooperation in the baseline treatment. Remember that first movers who cooperate send 50 points. In the baseline treatment, they receive on average a smaller amount in return. In contrast, first movers who cooperate in the punishment treatment receive back roughly twice the sent amount. It is clear that, even when it is possible to retaliate, punishment limits the opportunistic behavior of second movers. In the following paragraphs, we examine how subjects punish and retaliate.
Punishment and Retaliation
As Figure 3A illustrates (see also Table B1 ), a large number of subjects are willing to spend some or all their monetary gains in order to either punish second movers or retaliate against first movers. In fact, around one third of the cases in which first and second movers interact wind up in punishment by the first movers. Moreover, when
given the opportunity, retaliation by second movers is even more frequent (to be precise, the mean frequency of punishment is 27.8% and the mean frequency of retaliation is 40.0%). We even observe that, of the first movers who had the chance to punish second movers who retaliated, 55.6% decided to do so (we refer to this as 'additional punishment'). Figure 3B shows that the amount spent on punishment by first movers who got back less than 150 points was higher than the amount spent on retaliation by second movers how got punished (p = 0.001). Surely, since the earnings of first movers when they face retaliation was lower than the earnings of second movers when they face punishment, this is partly explained by the ability of first movers to spend more on reducing the other's payoff. Still, testing the difference in the frequency of punishment and retaliation, provides some evidence that first movers are more aggressive punishers than second movers (p = 0.002).
There are subjects from whom we have data from only one of the parts for various variables (e.g. a second mover who faces a first mover who cooperates in part 1 and a first mover who defects in part 2). In these cases, we take the data from the part for which we have information as that subject's mean. 
FIGURE 3 -FREQUENCY AND MEAN AMOUNT OF POINTS SPENT (GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY) REDUCING THE EARNINGS OF THE OTHER PLAYER
Although it is not predicted by traditional economic theory (assuming own-payoff maximization), the punishment behavior of first movers is not surprising given that similar behavior has been observed in numerous experiments (see Camerer, 2003) .
Similarly it is consistent that the amount and frequency of punishment increases as the amount returned decreases. 8 We find more unexpected the willingness of second movers to retaliate. After all, these subjects had behaved unkindly by returning less than 150 points.
Furthermore, when they had to decide whether they wanted to retaliate, 65.0% of second movers had earnings that were actually higher or equal to the earnings of the first mover. It is remarkable that 7 (i.e. 53.8%) of these 13 second movers chose a positive amount of retaliation. 9 Unlike first movers, we find that neither the amount 8 Comparing first movers who received 150 points with first movers who received 50 or 0 points gives a significant difference for both the amount and the frequency of punishment (in each part p < 0.001).
If we compare amount and frequency of punishment of first movers who received 50 points with those who received 0 points, we find a significant difference only for the amount of punishment in the second part (p = 0.020, and in all other cases p > 0.193). 9 This behavior is akin to 'misdirected' punishment in public good games. That is, punishment of high contributors by free-riders (Cinyabuguma et al., 2004; Gächter and Herrmann, 2005) .
nor frequency of retaliation depend on the behavior of the other player. For instance, although on average second movers who were punished substantially (above median punishment) retaliate less and less frequently than other second movers, 10 this difference is not significant (p > 0.621).
An instructive exercise is to calculate how retaliation affects the first movers'
'real' cost of punishment. Whenever first movers punish, they not only incur the cost of reducing the second mover's earnings, but they also risk further losses if the second mover decides to retaliate. 11 If there is no retaliation, the cost of punishment is 0.250 points per point reduced. If we include losses due to retaliation we find that, on average, first movers lost an additional 0.149 points per point reduced. This is a substantial increase of 59.4% in the cost of punishment. A similar analysis for the real cost of retaliation (given losses due to additional punishment) gives that second movers incur an additional 0.763 points per point reduced. This is a remarkable 305.6% increase in the cost of retaliation. 12 We now turn to how first and second movers adjust their behavior from part 1 to part 2.
Dynamics
As was already noted, the starkest difference between treatments concerning the behavior of first movers, is the large decrease in cooperation in the baseline treatment compared to the punishment treatment. On closer inspection, this difference is driven by two dissimilarities between the treatments. First, as shown in Figure 4 , first movers who got back less than 150 points were more likely to stop cooperating in the baseline treatment than in the punishment treatment (p = 0.013). Second, in the baseline treatment considerably more second movers chose to return less than 150 points (81.8% in the baseline treatment compared to 35.6% in the punishment treatment, p = 0.005). Hence, it appears that punishment has two desirable effects. On one hand, second movers anticipate punishment and as a result increase the amount returned. On 10 The amount of points spent and frequency of retaliation by second movers who were punished substantially was 6.71 points and 0.429. For the other second movers it was 4.23 points and 0.364. 11 The only case in which second movers cannot retaliate after being punished occurs when first movers who got back 0 points spend all of their remaining earnings punishing the second mover. In this case, both subjects end up with 0 points and no further retaliation is possible. 12 In fact, these calculations include pairs of subjects where no more punishment or retaliation was possible given that earnings were already zero points or less (e.g. see footnote 11). Excluding these observations raises the cost of punishment by 0.196, a 78.4% increase, and the costs of retaliation by 0.849, a 339.5% increase.
the other hand, after experiencing opportunistic behavior, first movers are more willing to keep on cooperating if they have the opportunity to punish. In fact, if we examine how first movers in the punishment treatment adjust their behavior, we find that, among the first movers who received less than 150 points, first movers who actually punished are less likely to stop cooperating than those who did not punish (see Figure 4 , p = 0.087). 
Percentage of first movers who stop cooperating FIGURE 4 -PERCENTAGE OF FIRST MOVERS WHO STOP COOPERATING DEPENDING ON THE AMOUNT RETURNED AND ON WHETHER OR NOT THEY PUNISHED WHEN THEY HAD THE OPPORTUNITY
We find a less clear pattern when we look at how second movers adjust their behavior. In both treatments, when given the opportunity, the majority of second movers choose the same action in both parts (80.0% in the baseline and 75.0% in the punishment treatment). Of those who change their decision, most of them decrease the amount returned (100.0% in the baseline and 84.6% in the punishment treatment). If we look at the effect of punishment, we find that, on average, second movers who were not punished decrease the returned amount, whereas second movers who were punished, increase it. However, this difference includes second movers who, after returning 150 points in the first part, decrease their returned amount. If we concentrate only on second movers who had a good chance of being punished (i.e. those who returned less than 150), we find that those who were not punished decrease their returned amount by 25.0 points whereas those who were punished increase it by 10.0 points (the difference is close to significance at the 10 percent level, p = 0.113). The main findings from the behavioral data can be summarized in the following result:
RESULT 
Emotions and Punishment
In this section, we first examine which of the first movers' emotions are clearly related to punishment. We find that anger-like emotions explain why some first movers punish while others do not. Subsequently, we concentrate on anger and analyze what triggers first movers to feel high intensities of this emotion.
Anger and Punishment
Throughout the experiment, first movers experienced a variety of emotions. However, we find that anger-like emotions are the only ones that are clearly related to the punishment decision. First movers that felt high intensities of anger-like emotions punish more than those who felt low intensities of these emotions. Furthermore, we also find that differences in anger-like emotions can explain why, after receiving retaliation, some first movers punish once again while others do not. As is illustrated in Figure 5 , first movers who, after observing the amount that was returned by the second mover, felt high intensities of anger punish more and more often than first movers who felt low intensities of anger (above or below the median, p < 0.001 for both part 1 and 2).
13 Similarly, after observing the amount of retaliation assigned to them by the second mover, first movers who felt angry punish more but not more often than first movers who did not feel as angry (above or below the median, p = 0.096 for the amount of additional punishment and p = 0.322 for its frequency).
Having found that punishment is related to experienced anger, the question arises what explains the different intensities of anger. We answer this question in the following paragraphs.
Causes of Anger
Anger experienced after observing the amount sent back by the second mover is caused by returns of less than 150 points, especially if they were unexpected or considered unfair (the complete emotional reaction of first movers to the amount returned can be found in Appendix B).
In both treatments, the most important trigger of high intensities of anger is simply receiving back less than 150 points. As can be observed in Table B3 , first movers in the punishment treatment who received 150 points felt lower intensities of anger than first movers who received either 50 or 0 points back (p < 0.001).
Moreover, although on average first movers who received 0 points were angrier than those who received 50 points, the difference is significant only in the second part (for part 1: p = 0.328, and for part 2: p = 0.075).
In addition to the returned amount, the first movers' expectations have an effect on the intensity of anger. In particular, first movers who overestimated the amount returned by the second mover tended to be angrier than first movers who underestimated it. For example, if we control for the amount that was actually returned by concentrating on first movers who got back 50 points, we find that first movers who were expecting back 150 points were angrier than first movers who were expecting back 50 or 0 points (in each part p < 0.043).
Lastly, we also observe that fairness perceptions influence the amount of anger experienced by first movers. First movers who thought it is unfair to return low amounts were angrier than those who thought that it is fair to return low amounts 13 Throughout this section, we report the results of tests done with the emotion of anger. However, we find very similar results and significance levels if we use irritation or (lack of) happiness.
(below or above median fairness). For instance, if we look again only at first movers who got back 50 points, we find that first movers who thought returning 50 was unfair were angrier than first movers who thought returning 50 was fair (p = 0.004).
14 Focusing on the emotional reaction of first movers to the amount of retaliation received from the second mover gives a comparable finding. Namely, first movers who faced no retaliation felt lower intensities of anger than first movers who faced positive retaliation (see Table B4 , p = 0.037 
Social Emotions and Retaliation
We now turn to the relationship between the emotions and behavior of second movers. To begin with, we investigate the relationship between the emotions of second movers and their decision to retaliate. We also analyze whether emotions influence how second movers adjust their behavior over time. Next, we try to explain the difference in the emotional reactions of second movers.
Shame and Retaliation
As with first movers, the emotional reaction of second movers seems to be clearly related to their behavior (the emotional reaction of second movers can be found in Table B5 ). In particular, second movers who felt no shame are more likely to retaliate 14 We get very similar results if we run a regression. Specifically, we estimate anger using the following independent variables: the returned amount, the expected returned amount, and the perceived fairness of returning 50 points. We find a positive coefficient for the returned amount (p = 0.001) and negative coefficients for the other two variables (p = 0.078 and p = 0.051). Ordered probit estimates using robust standard errors and clustering on each subject, χ 2 (3) = 74.4. than other second movers. Furthermore, we also find that, for second movers who were punished, experiencing shame induces them to correct their behavior. 
FIGURE 6 -FREQUENCY AND MEAN AMOUNT OF POINTS SPENT ON RETALIATION DEPENDING ON WHETHER SECOND MOVERS WERE ANGRY, SHAMEFUL OR NOT (ABOVE / BELOW THE MEDIAN)
As can be seen in Figure 6A , second movers who did not feel shame after being punished are more likely to retaliate than second movers who felt some shame (below or above the median, p = 0.045). 15 We also get a similar result if we test for differences in the amount of points spent on retaliation (p = 0.091).
Interestingly, we also find that anger has an effect on the second movers' decision to retaliate. However, in this case the effect is not as straight forward. A simple look at the relationship between anger and retaliation, suggests that second movers who are angry retaliate more and more often than second movers who are not angry (see Figure 6 ). However, these differences are not significant (p = 0.739 when testing for differences in the amount of retaliation and p = 0.965 for differences in frequency). The effect of anger becomes clear once we examine the interaction of anger and shame. In this case, a clear result is obtained. Namely, second movers who were angry and felt no shame retaliate more and more frequently than angry second movers who felt shame (p = 0.032 and p = 0.024 respectively).
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In addition to retaliation, feeling shame is also related to how second movers adjust their behavior from part 1 to part 2. In Section 3.3 it was shown that second movers who were punished tend to return more in the following part than second movers who were not punished. However, this difference is not significant. The emotional reaction of second movers reveals that the propensity of second movers to adjust their behavior after being punished depends on whether they felt shame or not.
On average, second movers who felt shame after being punished increase the amount returned by 35.7 points whereas those who felt no shame decrease the amount retuned by 12.5 points (above or below the median, p = 0.053). Since most second movers who returned less then 150 points were punished, we do not have enough observations to test the effects of shame on subjects that were not punished.
In conclusion, our results suggest that high intensities of anger provide second movers with a motivation to retaliate and high intensities of shame restrain them from doing so. Furthermore, shame seems to be necessary for punishment to have an effect on how second movers adjust their behavior. Next, we analyze what explains the differences in the intensities of anger and shame experienced by second movers.
Causes of anger and shame
The experience of anger among second movers depends on how many points they sent back to the first mover and on the amount of points the first mover spent punishing them. That is, second movers felt high intensities of anger if they received a high amount of punishment from the first mover. Furthermore, the intensity of anger is stronger the higher the amount they had returned before getting punished.
The most important reason why second movers get angry is simply receiving a positive amount of punishment (see Table B5 ). For example, second movers who were punished at least once reported significantly more anger than those who were never punished (p = 0.001). 17 Curiously, if we examine whether the amount of punishment has an effect on anger we do not find a significant result. For example, second movers who were punished by a very large amount were not significantly 16 For second movers who were not angry, there are no significant differences between those who felt shame and those who did not (p > 0.637). 17 This is also true if we restrict ourselves to second movers who returned less than 150 points (in this case, p = 0.002).
angrier than those who were punished by a very small amount (top versus bottom quartile, p = 0.624). However, once we take into account the amount the second mover returned, we find a somewhat clearer effect. Specifically, among second movers who returned 50 points, those who were punished by a very large amount were angrier than those who were punished by a very small amount (again, top versus bottom quartiles, and this time the difference is closer to significance, p = 0.133). The same patter exists for second movers who returned 0 points (this time, p = 0.168).
Lastly, for low amounts of punishment, second movers who returned 50 points were angrier than those who returned 0 points.
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More concisely, second movers became angry whenever they were punished, but if they had returned 50 instead of 0 points, they got angry at lower punishment amounts.
19 This is understandable given that second movers who returned 50 points not only behaved somewhat nicer than those who returned less, they also had lower earnings. Unlike first movers, we do not find that fairness perceptions or expectations (about the amount of punishment) have an effect on anger.
Unlike anger, it is not so clear what triggers different intensities of shame. We do find that, in both treatments, second movers who returned 150 points reported lower intensities of shame than those who returned less (p < 0.001). In the punishment treatment, this is true even when we control for whether or not the second mover faced punishment. Specifically, second movers who returned 150 points and were not punished felt lower intensities of shame than second movers who returned less and were also not punished (p = 0.001). In fact, punishment seems to have little if any effect on shame. For example, among second movers who returned less than 150, there is no significant difference in the amount of shame reported by those who were punished and those who were not (p = 0.602). Again, we do not find an effect of 18 For instance, among second movers who did not receive very high punishment (i.e. excluding the top quartile), second movers who returned 50 points were more likely to feel angry (above the median) than those who returned 0 points (p = 0.083). 19 These effects are more clearly captured in a regression. We estimate anger using the following independent variables: the amount returned, the expected amount of punishment, the perceived fairness of returning 50 points, and three variables I R for R ∈ {0, 50, 150} where I R = 0 if the amount returned was different from R and I R = amount of punishment if the amount returned was R. We obtain positive and significant coefficients for I 0 , I
50
, and I 150 (p < 0.001). Furthermore, the coefficients are all significantly different from each other (Wald tests, p < 0.009). This suggests that for a given amount of punishment, second movers are angrier the more they had returned. Ordered probit estimates using robust standard errors and clustering on each subject, χ 2 (6) = 73.8. 
Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that a realistic punishment institution, in which multiple rounds of punishment and retaliation are possible, is an effective tool for the support of cooperative behavior. However, retaliation is a commonly observed behavior that often results in the extreme reduction of the payoffs of the individuals involved.
Furthermore, we have confirmed, that anger-like emotions are an important motivation for punishment. Opportunistic behavior induces anger and thus increases the likelihood of punishment. Lastly, we have shown that the experience of prosocial emotions, namely shame and guilt, restrain angry individuals from retaliating.
Therefore, prosocial emotions can be seen as a mechanism managing the behavioral reactions of anger.
Given that costly punishment has been shown to be an effective way of enforcing cooperative behavior, it is important to have a good understanding of the motivations and reactions of both the punishers and the punished. We find interesting that individuals who are willing to punish are also willing to keep on cooperating (see Result 1). This guaranties that, as long as these individuals have the opportunity to punish, cooperation can be sustained. In other words, this kind of individuals might be enough to get cooperation going even when it is rare. In addition, the same type of people are necessary to support punishment in the presence of retaliation. If retaliation deters individuals from using the punishment mechanism, cooperation unravels (Nikiforakis, 2004) . However, if the opportunity to punish back always exists, this could prevent retaliation from limiting the punishment of opportunistic behavior.
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As expected, we find that the main motivation for the punishment of opportunistic behavior is experiencing anger. Furthermore, just like in related work, we confirm that individuals feel angrier the more money the other player takes (Bosman and van Winden, 2002) , the more unexpected was the opportunistic behavior (Ben-Shakhar et al., 2004) , and the more strongly the individual feels about fairness (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996) . In fact, our results show that each of these motivations has a separate effect on the intensity of anger and thus on the propensity to punish.
Knowing that punishment is triggered by the emotion of anger can help us model this type of behavior. Since the action tendency of anger is to attack (Lazarus, 1991) , thus to harm whoever is negatively affecting our interests, punishment can be seen as the consumption of a good from which pleasure is derived (Quervain et al., 2004) . Interpreting punishment as simply another good allows us to apply theoretical economic analysis to an otherwise puzzling phenomenon (see Carpenter, 2004) . It is important to point out that, even if anger was triggered by unfair behavior, the goal of angry individuals is to harm the other party, and not, through punishment, to correct unfairness. 21 For example, if in our game first movers who got back 50 points used punishment to rectify an unfair distribution of income, they should not spend more than 66.67 points on punishment (this amount gives both players equal earnings).
However, a substantial number of first movers punish more than this amount. 22 In this sense, outcome based models of social preferences such as Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) , and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) miss an important characteristic of punishment behavior (see also Reuben and van Winden, 2004) . 20 Unfortunately, we do not have enough observations to determine if retaliation deters punishment.
Only two first movers experienced both retaliation in part 1 and a second mover who returned less than 150 points in part 2. Given that both of these individuals punished the second mover in part 2, it appears that retaliation did not have much of an effect on them. 21 In this respect, as is argued by Carpenter and Matthews (2005) , there is an important difference between anger-induced punishment by the affected individual and indignation-induced punishment by an unaffected third party. 22 To be precise, 31.3% of the first movers who punished after receiving 50 points back punished, at least once, by more than 66.67 points.
An important and yet overlooked aspect of punishment is the emotional reaction of the punished. As was shown in this paper, prosocial emotions such as shame play a crucial role for the viability of punishment for the enforcement of social norms. In Section 5 we have shown that feeling shameful helps explain why some individuals who acted selfishly adjust their behavior whereas others do not. It has been observed that in public good games, the use of non-monetary punishment has a positive effect on contribution levels. 23 However, our results indicate that, it is the combination of feeling shame and receiving monetary punishment that has a significant effect on behavior. This suggests that shame alone will not have an effect if the cooperative norm is not actively enforced. Hence, although non-monetary punishment has the desirable property that it can affect behavior without losses in welfare, the lack of real consequences for free-riders might make this effect deteriorate over time (Masclet et al., 2003) . In this sense, as is shown by Noussair and Tucker (2005) , the best performing punishment institution is one in which both symbolic and monetary punishments are available.
Another essential role for shame is the prevention of retaliation by punished individuals. As was shown in Section 4, even if they acted unkindly, individuals do feel angry when they are punished. However, it is only those individuals who are angry and do not feel shame that decide to retaliate. Therefore, if it were not for some individuals experiencing shame, retaliation would be much more common and punishment of selfish behavior much more costly. Social emotions like shame are thus essential for the efficiency of a punishment institution. This supports the assumption that social emotions coevolved with institutions and anger-like emotions in order to limit antisocial actions (Bowles and Gintis, 2001 ). An interesting question for further exploration is the specific evolutionary mechanisms that lead to this situation.
Finally, even though we did not differentiate in our analysis between shame and guilt, we would like to stress that the action tendencies of the two emotions can be different (Tangney and Dearing, 2002) . On one hand, shame is related to a devaluation of the self, and therefore the action tendency of shame is withdrawal and avoidance of further contact. On the other hand, guilt is more related to the blameworthiness of an act and is thus more likely to result in reparation and action.
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Therefore, if an outside option is available in which the experience of shame can be avoided, anticipation of feeling shame might have undesired effects on the prevalence of prosocial behavior (Lazear et al., 2005) . In other words, when trying to decrease the frequency of selfish behavior, the attempt to explicitly induce shame, might result in avoidance of further interaction instead of in more cooperation.
Appendix A
These are the instructions for the first movers used in the punishment treatment. The instructions for the second mover and for the baseline treatment are available upon request.
A.1. Instructions Part 1
There are two types of participants in this part, participants A and participants B. Half of the persons participating in the experiment will be in the role of participant A, and the other half in that of participant B. You are a participant A.
In part 1 of the experiment, you will be randomly assigned a participant B.
During this part, you will interact only with this participant B. Moreover, you will not interact again with this participant in part 2 of the experiment. Part 1 consists of three steps. In step one, you must decide whether you will transfer points to participant B or if you will retain the points for yourself. In step two, participant B will decide if he will transfer points to you or if he will keep them himself. In step three, both of you must again make a decision. There are various options in step three, which will be explained below. We will also describe the exact experimental procedure on the next pages.
24 Economists usually distinguish shame and guilt by the visibility of ones actions. Shame is said to be triggered in social situations in which actions are seen by others, whereas guilt is more related to internalized values and hence is not influenced by the presence of others (e.g. Kandel and Lazear, 1992) . However, research by psychologists has shown that people feel shame even when their actions are unobserved (Tangney et al., 1996) , and that the experience of guilt varies considerably depending on the interpersonal context (Baumeister et al., 1994) .
Procedure for the three steps
At the beginning of part 1 you and participant B will each receive 100 points as earnings.
Step one
At the beginning of the first step you will receive 50 decision points. Participant B will receive no decision points. In step one, you must decide whether you want to transfer your 50 decision points to participant B or transfer no points to participant B.
If you transfer the 50 points, they will be multiplied by six, meaning that participant B will receive 6×50 = 300 points. Then, step two begins. If you decide to transfer nothing part 1 will end here.
Step two
In step two, participant B has to decide whether he will transfer 150, 50 or 0 points to you. You will then receive exactly the number of points B transferred.
Therefore, four possibilities exist after the first two steps: Hence, after step two your total earnings will be: 100 + the additional earnings from the table above.
Your additional earnings B's additional earnings
Step three
In step three, you will be informed how many points participant B transferred to you. Now, you can assign penalty points to participant B. The assignment of penalty points has financial consequences for both participants, A and B. Each penalty point which you assign costs you one point, while four points are deducted from your participant B. If you assign three penalty points to participant B, this will cost you three points and participant B will have twelve points deducted. If participant B assigned you penalty points, you and participant B will have the option to assign penalty points to each other in turns. Part 1 will end when either you or participant B decides to assign no penalty points, or if either you or participant B can not be assigned penalty points because your or his earnings are zero or less. In other words, as long as one of you assigns a positive amount of penalty points, the other will have the opportunity to assign penalty points back. Note that, you will be able to assign penalty points even if your earnings at that point are zero. Furthermore, you cannot be assigned penalty points if your own earnings are zero.
Finally
Remember that, you participate in part 1 only once. Therefore consider your decisions carefully. At the end of part 1 you will receive instructions for part 2 of the experiment.
Part 2
We will now give you the instructions for part 2 of the experiment.
Also in this part there will be two types of participants, participants A and participants B. Every person participating in the experiment will be in the role they had in part 1. Therefore, you are a participant A. As in part 1 you will be randomly assigned a participant B. During this part, you will interact only with this participant B. You can be certain that this participant B is not the same person as in part 1.
This part will consist of the same three steps as part 1. Therefore exactly the same instructions apply for part 2 as for part 1. Remember that you will participate in this part only once. Therefore consider your decisions carefully.
Examples of questions in the self-reports
To measure emotions:
Indicate how intensely you feel each of the following emotions right now, after knowing the amount that B transferred to you?
The subject then filled in a series of seven-point scales that ranged from 'not at all' (1) to 'very intensely' (7).
To measure expectations:
Player A can now assign you penalty points. How many penalty points do you think A will assign to you?
The subject then entered a point estimate.
To measure fairness perceptions:
Suppose that participant A transfers the 50 decision points to participant B.
Participant B has to choose to transfer back either 150 points, 50 points or 0 points. In your opinion, how fair do you believe is each of these choices:
If participant B transfers back 150 (50, 0) points this choice is ... ?
The subject then filled in three seven-point scales (one for each choice) that ranged from 'very unfair' (1) to 'very fair' (7). Table B1 and Table B2 summarize of the behavioral data for each treatment. 25 To be precise the data in this column is the mean behavior of each subject across both parts. In other words, first we take the mean behavior across parts for each subject and then we take the mean across all subjects. In the cases where a subject had only one opportunity to take an action, we take the data from that part as that subject's mean. The emotional reaction of first movers is summarized in Table B3 and Table B4 . In both tables, we present data from the punishment treatment. However, in the baseline treatment, the emotional reaction of first movers was statistically indistinguishable from the one in the punishment treatment. It seems that the opportunity to punish does not affect how first movers feel about the amount returned to them by second movers. The emotional reaction of second movers is summarized in Table B5 . Note: Little (a lot of) punishment means that the second mover lost less (more) than 100 points.
